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Abstract
There is a common problem in artificial intelligence (AI) and information
security. In AI, an expert system needs to be able to justify and explain
a decision to the user. In information security, experts need to be able
to explain to the public why a system is secure. In both cases, the goal
of explanation is to acquire or maintain the users’ trust. In this paper,
we investigate the relation between explanation and trust in the context
of computing science. This analysis draws on literature study and con-
cept analysis, using elements from system theory as well as actor-network
theory. We apply the conceptual framework to both AI and information
security, and show the benefit of the framework for both fields by means of
examples. The main focus is on expert systems (AI) and electronic voting
systems (security). Finally, we discuss consequences of our analysis for
ethics in terms of (un)informed consent and dissent, and the associated
division of responsibilities.
Keywords: actor-network theory, confidence, expert systems, explana-
tion, information security, informed consent, systems theory, trust
1 Introduction
In real life, we are tempted to trust persons if they can explain to us why they do
what they do. And we are tempted to trust a car if the dealer can tell us why it
is safe (which is harder if you just had to call back lots of cars because of safety
issues). This is often how trust appears to work: it requires an explanation of
the person or thing that we may or may not trust. Such explanations we may
simply accept, or we may base our decisions upon them. If you have given me
satisfactory explanations in the past, I may even refrain from requesting them
in the future.
In this sense, explanation and trust seem to be common partners in everyday
life. What we focus on in this paper, is the special case of interactions in the
digital environment. Also in the digital world explanation and trust show up
together quite often, and in very different domains. Artificial agents need to
explain their decision to the user in order to gain trust, and the designers of
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secure websites need to explain to the banking client why they can safely do
their transactions online.
Trust in digital environments has been called ‘e-trust’, and the question
whether this is possible at all has received considerable attention.1 Issues that
could influence one’s opinion here are 1) whether trust is possible without face-
to-face interaction and 2) whether artificial agents are capable of trusting and/or
being trusted. In the present analysis, we assume that e-trust is possible based
on the simplifying assumption that trust refers to “expectations which may
lapse into disappointments”.2 We will elaborate on our notion of trust, based on
Luhmann’s analysis, in further sections. Similarly to the concept of e-trust, we
speak about e-xplanation to refer to digital forms of explanations, or traditional
forms of explanation that concern digital devices.
In this paper, we will investigate the relation between e-xplanations and e-
trust from a philosophical perspective. After discussing the research background
and definitions of the necessary concepts (section 2), we will analyse this rela-
tion based upon literature study and conceptual analysis (section 3). Following
this, we will apply the analysis to both information security (section 4) and AI
(section 5). Finally, we discuss the ethical consequences of the analysis (section
6), and draw conclusions on the benefits and limitations of our analysis (section
7).
The contributions of this research are 1) the notion of explanation program
and its relation to explanation trees3, 2) an account of the relation between
explanation and trust based on system theory and actor-network theory, 3) the
application of this analysis to AI and information security and 4) the ethical
implications of the analysis in terms of informed consent.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 E-xplanation research
In artificial intelligence, research has been done into explanation in expert sys-
tems. Expert systems are systems that suggest solutions to problems that would
normally require a human expert to solve. Such problems may include medi-
cal diagnosis, industrial process analysis, and financial decisions. A particular
type of such systems are case-based reasoning systems, in which solutions to
problems are proposed based on retrieval of similar problems from memory, and
adapting their solutions. Explanation in such systems has been addressed by
Sørmo et al. [2005] and Roth-Berghofer and Cassens [2005]. In a quite different
setting, research has also been done into explanations for belief-desire-intention
(BDI) agents in virtual training environments.4
Ye and Johnson [1995] give three possible types of explanations in expert
systems: traces, justifications and strategies. With traces, a detailed record
1Taddeo [2009].
2Luhmann [1988].
3The latter in a philosophical rather than technical sense, cf. Freuder et al. [2000].
4Harbers et al. [2009].
2
of reasoning steps is given. Justifications focus more on the logical argument,
whereas strategies are higher-level approaches that the expert system applies to
the information it possesses.
Empirical research into user’s trust in agents has revealed some interest-
ing results that easily fit into our analysis. Glass et al. [2008] conclude that
trust depends on granularity of explanations and on transparency of the system.
Another study compares different explanation interfaces for recommender sys-
tems in terms of user trust.5 The results suggest that what the authors call an
‘organisation-based’ explanation does a better job than a simple computational
explanation of why a recommendation shows up in the list. In organisation-
based approaches, recommendations are categorised according to common fea-
tures. Benefits of explanations in intelligent systems are discussed by Gregor and
Benbasat [1999]. This paper offers an account of why explanations in computer
systems are a good idea in the first place, from a psychological perspective.
From a computer security perspective, there is quite a substantial amount
of research into trust.6 Here, the question is how it is possible to communi-
cate the analysis that experts have made of a security-sensitive system to the
public. Why is it secure? Or, more appropriately: How is it secure? Thus, it
is (implicitly) assumed that explanations are required for trust. Explanations
are thought to bridge the gap between “actual security” and “perceived secu-
rity”, which, when taken beyond its common sense meaning, is a philosophical
problem in itself.7
In this paper, we focus on the case of electronic voting (e-voting). When
paper voting was increasingly replaced by electronic voting machines or even
Internet voting, this issue has led to debates in various countries. In the USA,
public pressure has led to the printing of paper copies of each vote cast on a
machine.8 In the Netherlands, electronic voting has been abolished altogether
based on the research and perseverance of a pressure group.9 Parallel to these
developments, new electronic voting schemes were designed in computing sci-
ence, but the security of such schemes is complicated, and users may not be
easily convinced. In the testing trajectory of a Dutch Internet voting system,
too complex vote verification procedures reduced trust in the system.10
Explanations of security are not the same as usability, which is also impor-
tant in electronic voting. Of course, easy operation and good instructions on how
to use the system are vital, but this problem has been dealt with elsewhere.11
Here, we focus on responses to questions on how the votes are protected.
In artificial intelligence, explanations are usually provided by the system
itself. In information security, explanations are provided by the designers.12
5Pu and Chen [2006].
6Shneiderman [2000]; Fahrenholtz and Bartelt [2001]; Nikander and Karvonen [2001];
Chopra and Wallace [2002]; Oostveen and Van den Besselaar [2004]; Randell and Ryan [2006].
7Pieters [2010].
8Mercuri [2002].
9Gonggrijp et al. [2006].
10Hubbers et al. [2005].
11See e.g. Bederson et al. [2003].
12Even when the system explains, the designer of course designs the method of explanation.
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Nonetheless, in both artificial intelligence and information security, the role of
explanations consists for a major part of acquiring and maintaining the trust
of the user of the system. From the AI perspective as well as the information
security perspective, there is a need for a better understanding of the relation
between explanation and trust. In order to achieve this, we first need to look
at definitions of central concepts.
2.2 Central concepts
2.2.1 Explanation
Dictionary definitions of the verb ‘explain’ acknowledge that explanations may
have different goals: they may be about describing something in detail, about
offering reasons, or about giving instructions on how to do something. We do
not consider the latter category here. In computer science, this type amounts to
explanations on how to use the system, which are instructions rather than ex-
planations in a stricter sense. We focus on the meanings of justification (offering
reasons) and transparency (describing in detail).
Roth-Berghofer and Cassens [2005] and Sørmo et al. [2005] distinguish five
different explanation goals for case-based reasoning expert systems: justification
(explain why the answer is a good answer), transparency (explain how the sys-
tem reached the answer), relevance (explain why a question asked is relevant),
conceptualisation (clarify the meaning of concepts) and learning (teach the user
about the domain). Relevance can be seen as a special kind of justification.
Conceptualisation and learning have goals similar to instruction, which we said
we would not discuss. The remaining two goals, transparency and justification,
are the central ones in our framework.
When an explanation is given with respect to a specific goal, certain aspects
of it may require further explanation. These are called subgoals. In this paper,
we make use of explanation trees to visualise the relation between explanation
goals and subgoals. An explanation tree is a tree in which the goals and subgoals
of an explanation are ordered systematically (see figure 1). Whereas Freuder
et al. [2000] use the concept in a technical sense, we interpret it in the wider
context of explaining the decisions or design of a system to the user.
In information security, such trees have a close relation to attack and defence
trees.13 An attack tree is a tree in the mathematical sense in which possible ways
to compromise the security of an information system are systematically ordered.
The nodes in the tree correspond to the different steps that an attacker would
have to take to break into the system. It is possible to construct a similar tree
with defence measures, a defence tree.
Similarly, we can construct a pair of a question and an explanation tree
when the concern is not securing the system, but making it able to provide
the user with explanations. If the system is not able to give the user sufficient
information, the ‘attack’ has succeeded.
This will be dealt with further in the paper in terms of the concept of delegation.
13Schneier [1999]; Mauw and Oostdijk [2006].
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[husband] Why did you take the bus?
[wife] Because it was raining and I didn’t have an umbrella.
[husband] Why was it raining?
[husband] Why didn’t you have an umbrella?
Figure 1: Example explanation tree
As in attack trees, nodes in explanation trees can be AND or OR nodes. An
AND node indicates that all connected subgoals need to be realised in order
to make the explanation successful; an OR node means that only one of the
subgoals needs to be achieved. For reasons of concision, we include both ques-
tions and answers in the same tree, using indentation to represent subgoals (i.e.
subquestions).
2.2.2 Trust
Trust is a form of self-assurance. It entails reliance upon something else, and
the belief that this other will not fail in meeting certain expectations. However,
the grounds on which self-assurance is based can be quite different.
In earlier work14, we distinguished between confidence and trust in informa-
tion systems based on the work of Niklas Luhmann [1979, 1988]. Confidence
means self-assurance of the safety or security of a system without knowing the
risks or considering alternatives. Trust means self-assurance by assessment of
risks and alternatives. The essential difference is that in case of trust, a decision
is made to rely or not to rely on the person or system. In daily life, we rely on
many expectations without consciously considering the possible impact in case
of failure. We have confidence in electricity supply, in people obeying traffic
rules, etc. When there are different options possible, such as in choosing a bank
for one’s savings, a comparison needs to be made, and trust takes the place of
confidence.
Similar examples are found in relation to digital devices. If a voting system
functions properly, people will have confidence in it without exactly knowing
how it works or considering alternatives. When problems arise and e-voting and
paper voting are compared as alternatives based on risks assessment, trust (or
distrust) takes the place of confidence. The conclusion of our earlier analysis was
that by drawing a clear distinction between e-voting and paper voting, a pressure
group in the Netherlands succeeded in creating consensus on the necessity for
voting systems to be trustworthy, rather than reliable only. This is because
when two alternatives are compared, their properties need to be visible, which
was not the case with the existing e-voting systems.
This analysis can be generalised to other technologies. Computer security
experts generally aim at exchanging confidence for trust by explicating the risks
of systems. We have seen this with building access cards, privacy in Facebook,
14Pieters [2006].
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and many more. The question we ask in this paper is which role explanations
play in the dynamics of confidence and trust.
2.2.3 Black boxes
In both expert systems and security-sensitive systems, the black box character
of systems lacking explanations is often mentioned.15 The concept of black box
then denotes a lack of visibility or observability. As it is easily argued that black
box systems are not trustworthy either, as we have seen in the previous discus-
sion of confidence and trust, the concept of black box can form an important
connection between explanation and trust. However, this concept can mean
very different things depending on the language game in which it is used. We
therefore need to distinguish these meanings clearly before we proceed.
At least two meanings of black box can be distinguished. In the common
sense meaning, a black box is something that outputs something based on certain
inputs, but that we do not know the inner workings of. This applies above all
to technological artefacts. In a more philosophical sense, as advanced by Bruno
Latour [2005] in his actor-network theory, a black box is something that has
been ‘blackboxed’; a theory or technology of which the supporting network of
actants has become invisible. An actant, according to Latour, is anything that
participates in actions in a network of relations, and becomes what it is by means
of the network. In the latter sense, other phenomena such as scientific theories
or political systems can be characterised as black boxes as well. As there is no
opportunity to discuss actor-network theory in detail here, the important point
to remember is that black boxes need not always be purely technological.
In the first sense, a black box consists only of non-human parts. This is what
is usually meant when it is said that electronic voting machines are black boxes.
In the second sense, both humans and non-humans can be part of a black box.
In this sense, paper voting could be said to be a ‘blacker box’ than electronic
voting, because the network around paper voting has been largely concealed
over its relatively long history, hiding risks and security measures inside. It is
the latter meaning in which we will use the concept of black box in the following.
Latour associated the process of blackboxing with three other phenomena:
translation, composition and delegation. We will use these concepts in our
analysis of explanation and trust, but first we will discuss the meaning given to
these concepts by Latour.
Composition means that actants in a network form a composite actant to
which actions can be attributed. In this way, the government and an electronic
voting machine manufacturer can be ‘composed’ when they address the security
of the machines, or an expert system and its designer can be composed when
justifying the decisions of the system. Translation denotes that intentions and
possibilities for action change when actants join forces. Latour calls these in-
tentions and possibilities the ‘action program’. Following a traditional example,
15Harris [2003]; Nugent and Cunningham [2005]; Gonggrijp et al. [2006]; Open Rights Group
[2007].
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a man plus a gun has different action possibilities than a man or a gun alone.16
Lastly, part of an action program can be delegated to different actants. The
responsibility of keeping an eye on the speed limit can thus be delegated to a
ramp.
In the following, we will combine the actor-network terminology with the ac-
counts of explanation and trust, in order to get a comprehensive understanding
of their relation.
3 E-xplanation and e-trust
In this section, we combine the notions of explanation, trust and black box, as
discussed above, in a conceptual analysis of their relation in information systems.
The analysis thus combines Luhmann’s definitions of trust and confidence with
an actor-network view on social relations. This combination is pragmatic rather
than aimed at authenticity to the original viewpoints of the sources.
3.1 Explanation programs
In the following, we ‘translate’ the actor-network concepts to the field of expla-
nation and trust. First of all, the type of action that we are specifically interested
in is explanation. Actants can thus be said to have an explanation program, i.e.
their action program projected on the domain of explanation. When actants
are asked to explain something about a theory or system, they have certain
intentions and possibilities for explaining in a certain way. This explanation
program is translated when actants join forces. For example, the government
plus a commercial manufacturer has different explanation possibilities than the
government alone when it comes to e-voting: because of commercial interests,
it may no longer be able to reveal the source code of the program used.
Responsibilities for explanation can be delegated to other actants, but this
also means that the explanation program changes, because the other actants
will have different interests and a different understanding of the problem. This
holds both for delegation to other humans or organisations, and for delegation
to machines. In both cases, the new actant will not have the same capabilities
for explanation as the actant that delegated the responsibility for explanation
to it. If explanation of decisions is delegated to an expert system, it will have
different explanation possibilities than its designer, if only because it has more
limited knowledge of the world.
Delegation means exchanging one’s own trust for confidence: in delegation,
one no longer needs to understand what is to be explained fully oneself. Instead,
one has confidence in the actant to which the responsibility of explanation is
delegated.
An explanation program can be represented in an explanation tree, as a
security policy can be represented in a defence tree. The formal composition
16Verbeek [2005].
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of explanation programs and explanation trees of different actants, both for
cooperation and for delegation, would be a topic for further study.
3.2 Explanation-for-{trust,confidence}
An explanation may have different goals, as we have seen. The most important
goals we distinguished are transparency and justification. Depending on the goal,
an explanation can either aim at acquiring confidence or at acquiring trust.
Explanation-for-trust can thus be contrasted with explanation-for-confidence.
When we remember that trust entails a decision and confidence does not, the
former aims at enabling the user to compare different alternatives by describing
them in detail. The latter aims at allowing the user to be confident in using a
system, without having to consider different options.
Explanation-for-trust is explanation of how a system works, by revealing
details of its internal operations. Explanation-for-confidence is explanation that
makes the user feel comfortable in using the system, by providing information
on its external communications. In explanation-for-trust, the black box of the
system is opened; in explanation-for-confidence, it is not.
In both meanings of the concept of black box, a black box cannot acquire
trust, but only confidence. Black boxes can be explained to their environment,
but only as an explanation-for-confidence: the explanation concerns the external
communications of the system. Black boxes can be opened when trust is required
instead of confidence; this opening produces an explanation-for-trust of how the
system or network does what it is supposed to do; it reveals part of the inner
workings, thereby reveals part of the risks, and thereby trades confidence for
(possible) trust.17
A network has an explanation program that can reply to questions on trans-
parency and justification. This explanation program is distributed over (del-
egated to) different actants in the network. If the network can only reply to
questions of justification, it can be considered a black box. In such a case, the
network can only acquire confidence of the environment. Once trust is required,
the black box needs to be opened in order to supply explanations-for-trust, in
response to questions of transparency. In the latter case, the system thus needs
to be designed in such a way that this is actually possible; this amounts to
design for transparency.
If the explanation program of the network around a technology is strong
enough, the black box of the inner mechanisms of the technology itself may
not need to be opened. This was the case with electronic voting in the Nether-
lands before the efforts of a pressure group forced explanations aiming for trans-
parency.
17Following Vico [Berlin, 1976], we may argue that we can understand better something
that we have created ourselves than something that is ‘given’. In that sense, the human mind
is more a black box than a computer system, and we can explain the decisions of a computer
system better than those of a human mind. Apparently, this does not mean that we trust a
computer more than a human being.
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4 Explanation and trust in information security
In the domain of information security, explanation of the security of the sys-
tem to the user is an important requirement. This is especially true because
security is not instantly visible in using a system, as security of a system is not
a functional requirement. One cannot argue that because the system produces
acceptable results, it is therefore secure. Intruders may have broken in and
changed results without anyone noticing. Instead, insight must be given in the
measures that have been taken to protect the system against intruders.
Users also need to be instructed in how to operate the system securely, for
example checking whether they are really communicating with the e-banking
site by means of the certificate. This is not the type of explanation we focus
on here, as it is another example of explanation meaning instruction. Here, we
are interested in the role of explanations that allow the user to form an opinion
about (the security of) the system.
In the case of information security, explaining is about describing something
in detail, in this case the security measures that are implemented in the system
in order to protect the user from harm. Transparency is usually seen as the main
goal, especially in e-voting. Transparency is then seen as essential for allowing
the users to understand what the designers have done to protect them. Whether
transparency also contributes to the security of the system itself is heavily de-
bated: some would argue that making the protection mechanisms public will
enhance the capabilities of the attackers, whereas other would argue that pro-
tection mechanisms can be improved by public scrutiny. Keeping the security
mechanisms inside the black box, disabling explanations for transparency, is
often referred to as ‘security by obscurity’.18
The security of a system thus needs to be explained to the user in order to
allow her to make an informed decision on whether to use it. The explanation
is an explanation-for-trust. This is, of course, only useful if alternatives are
available. For example, in the Netherlands, citizens can decide for themselves
whether they wish to be a donor, and the information provided is meant to
enable them to make a reasonable decision on whether to accept the procedure.
In case of an obligatory measure, like an electronic ID card or passport, it is
more important to create confidence, as people do not have a choice.
The primary question in security is thus a ‘how’: the user may request an
explanation of how the system is secured, in order to accept using it. However,
even if the main goal is transparency, this may involve subgoals that can be
of a different type. The explanation programs are usually associated with the
designers rather than the system itself. Of course, part of the explanation
program can be delegated to the system, e.g. in the form of a help function, as
long as the help offered is not only instruction on how to use the program, but
also information on how it works and how it is protected.
Once transparency is established (how?), questions may be asked regarding
the reasons for design decisions, including security measures (why?). The ex-
18Mercuri and Neumann [2003].
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[user] How do you protect your security (transparency)?
[system] Ask the designer!
[designer] By these measures.
[user] Why these measures (justification)?
[designer] Because they protect against these attacks.
Figure 2: An example explanation tree for information security.
planation goal then changes from transparency into justification. This can be
represented in subgoals in the explanation tree (figure 2). In the tree, although
not represented, different explanations are possible for the same question. These
explanations may in turn trigger different follow-up questions. In design, such
explanation requirements can be anticipated by including explanation trees in
the design process, which would be a topic for further research.
As we have argued before, the explanation program in information security is
typically delegated to the designers of the system. This means that explanation
is not an explicit part of the design of the system, but rather a (business)
strategy for dealing with questions about security.
Our case study in the information security field is e-voting. This is the same
topic that was addressed in our earlier work.19 We extend the analysis that was
given there with the concepts of explanation and black box.
In electronic voting, two approaches can be distinguished: the Dutch and the
British.20 In the Dutch case, there was one channel available to the citizens to
cast their votes, which can be electronic or paper. The local authorities decided
which channel would be used (paper has been the only option since a change of
law in 2009). In the UK e-voting pilots, multiple channels were offered to the
voters, and they could decide themselves which one they wish to use. In the
Dutch case, the government needed to create confidence in the systems used,
since citizens did not have the choice to go for a different option. In the British
case, explanations of the systems could have the role of allowing citizens to
choose, enabling trust rather than confidence.
In electronic voting, an explanation-for-confidence of the use of electronic
voting machines is that they produce faster results. Or, alternatively, that they
are more reliable and accurate than paper voting. Or, alternatively, that they
have been tested by an accreditation organisation. In such explanations, the
black box of the system is not being opened. The primary goal is justification.
An explanation-for-trust would be an account of the measures that have been
implemented to guarantee security. At the highest level of detail, the source code
could be made available. The latter, of course, would not be an explanation for
the general public, and may therefore not be sufficient to establish public trust
in the system. The primary goal in such explanations is transparency.
19Pieters [2006].
20Pieters and van Haren [2007].
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Following this distinction, we can argue that the Dutch government should
have had an explanation program that aimed for confidence, whereas the British
government should have aimed for trust. Indeed, in the Dutch case, the gov-
ernment for a long time clung to the explanation that there was nothing wrong
with the electronic voting machines, even when their security was challenged by
the pressure group. From the analysis of explanation in relation to confidence
and trust, this was a sensible way to handle the issue: as citizens did not have
a choice, confidence in the existing system needed to be upheld.
In the British case, the government could be much more pragmatic: if the
security of any of the systems would be challenged, this could be investigated
thoroughly, and if the system was found not to be trustworthy, it could be
excluded from further pilots.
The situation in the Netherlands can also be explained in terms of black
boxes. Following Latour’s analysis of technology, an e-voting system is composed
of a network of actants, humans and non-humans. Part of the network may be
black-boxed; the inner workings are not being observed from the outside.
The e-voting systems that were introduced in the Netherlands in the early
nineties were able to hide in the existing black box of the voting system. One
may argue that the paper voting system has increasingly become a black box
over its relatively long history. The electronic voting machines were put inside
without opening it. However, even for paper voting it has not always been
like that: major debates have happened on the replacement of oral voting with
paper voting.21.
In any case, the black box was not opened further when electronic voting
machines were introduced. An explanation-for-confidence was enough: e-voting
would be faster and more accurate. Many e-voting systems of the same gen-
eration were black boxes in the common sense meaning. From a Latourian
perspective, however, they are part of a network that helps to maintain the
black box status of the whole network: the inner workings – not only of the
technology but of its socio-technical surroundings as well – are kept invisible to
the environment, for example by keeping evaluation reports secret.
At the same time, black box voting has become subject to increasing scrutiny,
by pressure groups as well as the scientific information security community.
These developments require the black boxes to be opened; they have led to
a requirement for explanations-for-trust, related to transparency. Now that
most countries have been studying their existing e-voting solutions following
public pressure, a new generation of voting systems seems to be needed that
can actually provide explanations-for-trust (or at least their designers should be
able to provide these). This, however, is not trivial, as a bad explanation-for-
trust may fail to create trust, and even lead to distrust.
What can happen to e-voting once the trust issues have been solved? If
it will be a successful project at all, adjusting the explanation program to the
requirements of the environment is necessary. To achieve this, new actors may
need to be pulled into the network, which are able to complete the explanation
21Park [1931].
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tree of the system. Such actors may include pressure groups. Getting the
actors in the e-voting network requires making them trust the project. If the
supporting network is stabilised in this way, confidence of the environment may
be established. Only then can e-voting become a black box in the Latourian
sense, by making the explanation program hide the details of the inner workings
(again).
5 Explanation and trust in AI
In the case of AI, the most important explanation goal is justification, or offering
reasons for an action. The reason for a decision, diagnosis or advice needs to
be justifiable to the user. The primary question is a ‘why’; the main goal of
explanation in expert systems is justification.
Interestingly, in the history of AI, reasoning traces, which can be charac-
terised as ‘how’-explanations, preceded the ‘why’-type.22 The easiest way of
telling the user what is going on is just dumping what has been going on in the
system. In this sense, the ‘why’-explanations are technologically more advanced,
as they require a more subtle judgement on what should and what should not
be shown to the user. Still, this also holds for the ‘how’ explanations in security,
as we have seen in the previous section.
Even though the primary goal in AI is justification, the other explanation
goals for CBR systems can occur as subgoals in an explanation tree with jus-
tification as the root goal. For example, in order to justify a decision, it may
be necessary to explain certain concepts, or to provide more detail about how
the system reached the decision. Thus, whereas the main goal in AI can be
characterised as justification, other goals play a role as well.
Subgoals may thus include transparency of system design; from this point
on, trust is the issue instead of confidence. For example, if the user does not
have confidence in the explanation, she may wish to find out how the system
constructed that explanation. She may suspect an error in the system, and
will now proceed to request transparency. The explanation goal then changes
from justification into transparency. This can be represented in subgoals in the
explanation tree (figure 3).
Note that the latter question cannot be answered from the explanation pro-
gram of the machine itself. Usually, answering this question should be done
by the designer, except when it has been delegated to the machine via a help
function. Note also that there is an analogy between explanations in AI and a
common distinction in philosophy of science: the distinction between the context
of discovery and the context of justification. Explanations-for-confidence then
correspond to the context of justification (of a decision), whereas explanations-
for-trust correspond to the context of discovery (of a decision).
In AI systems, the black box character is not necessarily a problem. As long
as the users have confidence in the decisions of the system, they may not be
interested in how it works. Therefore, the explanations of expert systems are
22Ye and Johnson [1995].
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[user] Why did you make this decision (justification)?
[system] Because this and this is the case.
[user] How did you make this decision (transparency)?
[system] By these and these steps.
[user] Why these and these steps (justification)?
[system] Ask the designer!
[designer] Because I used the approach from this paper.
Figure 3: An example explanation tree for an expert system.
mainly explanations-for-confidence. Only when the user suspect that something
is wrong, transparency will be required by means of explanations-for-trust.
The explanation trees in artificial intelligence are in a way mirrored with
respect to information security. In security, justification emerges as a subgoal
when an answer to a transparency question is not sufficient to the user. In AI,
transparency emerges as a subgoal when an answer to a justification question
is not sufficient. This mirror effect is one of the interesting results of our anal-
ysis. To understand the consequences of this result, a further dialogue between
security and AI on the topic of explanation would be beneficial.
If expert systems can reach a level of explanation that creates as much
confidence in these systems as we have in people, they may become increasingly
blackboxed phenomena in our society. The need for knowing precisely how they
work may become less pronounced, even if we know more about how they work
than we know about how people work, for we designed expert systems ourselves.
6 Ethical consequences
The analysis of explanation and trust has ethical consequences when we connect
it to the notion of informed consent, which can be defined as “an autonomous
authorisation by a patient or subject”.23 Although often seen in a medical or
research context, the notion is important to understand the meaning of expla-
nation and trust for responsibilities. In the present case, this amounts to the
explanation of the system to the user, and the object of consent is the use of
the system (or its outputs). The main question here is what can be said to be
informed consent given the characteristics of the explanation of an IT system,
and what needs to be denoted rather as uninformed consent, informed dissent,
or uninformed dissent. This has consequences for responsibility, as we will see.
Our point of view here is that ‘informed’ does not merely indicate that
sufficient information has been given, but also that the type of explanation
is justifiable and that not too much information is given. This is directly re-
lated to the concepts of explanation-for-trust and explanation-for-confidence,
as the goals of these types of explanations are different. One cannot speak
23See e.g. Faden et al. [1986].
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about informed consent if one gives too little information, but one cannot speak
about informed consent either if one gives too much. Indeed, giving too much
information might lead to uninformed dissent, as distrust is invited by super-
fluous information. When the user has a choice between different alternatives,
explanations-for-trust needs to contribute to the understanding of the issues by
the user. When there is only one sensible option, explanations-for-confidence
can help in justifying it to the user. If an explanation-for-confidence does not
suffice, and the user wishes to consider alternatives anyway, the system should
be able to switch to an explanation-for-trust.
The characteristics of the explanations given by IT systems may have con-
sequences for responsibility. If an acceptable kind of explanation is given, and
the user trusts the application based on the explanation (informed consent), the
user can be said to share the responsibility for the consequences of using the
system.
The question of responsibility holds both for security and for AI. If the
designers of a secure system can explain security measures and remaining risks
to the user (explanation-for-trust), the user can be said to have a reasonable
choice in deciding to use the system or not. Given the explanation, the user
will not be able to hold the system (or its designers) responsible for security
failures, because she has been given proper information about security measures
and remaining risks. In such a case, responsibility for the risks could be said to
rest with the user (even though legislation may judge otherwise).
In AI, a user of an expert system can be held responsible for a decision
made with use of the system, as long as the user has a reasonable way of know-
ing whether the decision proposed by the system is sensible (explanation-for-
confidence). A decision or diagnosis proposed by the system, when accompa-
nied by a satisfying explanation, will keep the user responsible for accepting
or rejecting the proposed solution, and thereby avoid users shirking their own
responsibility.
These concepts will become increasingly important with the advent of ambi-
ent intelligence24, which exhibits both the features of AI and security-sensitive
systems. When everything in our environment is collecting information about
us and making decisions for us, we will need a way of consenting to what is
happening, or we will not be responsible for anything. This makes a remaining
question quite urgent, which is how the socio-technical system around infor-
mation systems can be designed such that the required explanations can be
provided. It is important to avoid the pitfalls of explanation there.
There are two ways in which explanations can miss their goal. Too little
detail does not explain-for-trust: it fails to open the black box, by only providing
superficial reasons.25 These reasons are usually ‘why’-explanations instead of
24Cf. Brey [2005]: “Using smart objects requires a basic trust in their judgments, and if
these judgments conflict with the users own judgments or intuitions, then the user has to
choose whether to rely on herself or on a piece of technology that may or may not know her
better than she does herself.”
25Tavani [2004] provides an interesting discussion of the relation between informed consent
and ‘opacity’, which is comparable to ‘blackboxness’.
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level of detail result
too low explanation fails
low (why?) explanation-for-confidence, justification
high (how?) explanation-for-trust, transparency
too high explanation fails
Table 1: Different levels of detail in explanations
‘how’. For example, the government may say that the e-voting systems are
secure because they have been accredited. Such explanations may contribute to
confidence (and were helpful in the Dutch case), but fail when trust is required,
because the black box is not being opened. Too much detail, on the contrary,
does not explain-for-trust. It fails to make the system comprehensible, because
the user is not capable of processing the information at this level of detail.
A too detailed explanation-for-confidence may fail to reach its goal, because
it does not explain-for-confidence. It aims for trust instead of confidence, by
opening the black box of the system. For example, a system may provide a
complete reasoning trace when only some indications are required by the user
in order to provide her with confidence. In that case, it may even decrease
confidence. On the other hand, too little detail will not explain-for-confidence.
Explanations, therefore, should 1) aim for the right goal (why or how) and
2) carry the right amount of information, in order to provide informed consent
to the user, and thereby keep (human) responsibilities clear. Thus, the level
of abstraction on which the explanation is given needs to be right in order
to speak about informed consent of the user. We can map levels of detail to
different results of explanations (table 1).
All of this, obviously, does not mean that designers will no longer be respon-
sible for what their systems do, as long as they have consent from the user. On
the contrary, the designers are responsible for designing their systems in such
a way that responsible behaviour by their users is encouraged. But users can
only act responsibly if they have access to the right explanations.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the relation between explanations and trust in infor-
mation systems, in particular security-sensitive applications and expert systems.
From the literature, we took the distinction between confidence and trust, dif-
ferent explanation goals and Latour’s concepts of action program, translation,
composition, blackboxing and delegation. Combining these in a conceptual
analysis, we introduced the notions of explanation program, explanation-for-
confidence and explanation-for-trust.
The framework helps us to make clear what we mean when we say that a
system has to be able to explain things to the user, or that the system itself
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needs to be explainable. Our analysis illuminates the difference between the use
of explanations in AI and the use of explanations in information security.
In information security, explanation is mostly aimed at transparency with
respect to security measures; this requires opening the black box of the system.
In AI, explanation is mostly used to give the user confidence in the decisions of
the system. This does not require opening the black box. The user is generally
not interested in how the system reached the decision, but primarily in why it
is judged to be a good decision.
We discussed that a bad explanation-for-trust may fail to create trust: too
little detail does not explain-for-trust; too much detail does not explain-for-trust.
A too detailed explanation-for-confidence may fail to reach its goal, because it
does not explain-for-confidence; it aims for trust instead of confidence (such as
a complete reasoning trace when only some indications are required); in that
case, it may even destroy confidence. Too little detail does not explain-for-
confidence. Only if the right kind of information is given can informed consent
on using the system and its outputs be established, and can responsibility be
clearly allocated.
The relation between explanation and trust is especially critical in the case
of e-trust, since in that case, other mechanisms that relate to embodied presence
are unavailable. Therefore, explanations may be an important prerequisite for
the building of e-trust. In that case, the properties of the explanation programs,
and the associated modes of trust, are vital for assigning responsibilities.
In this paper, we focused on trust of the user in the system. When ex-
planations need to be given not only to humans but also to computer agents,
explanations will probably take a different form. How the difference between
confidence and trust can be applied in such a setting, and whether mutual trust
between artificial agents can be addressed from the perspective of explanations,
are interesting questions for future research.
We hope that the concepts we introduced are able to generate lively discus-
sions on implementations of technology and the associated explanation obliga-
tions in general. Do not hesitate to contact us for further explanation on how
and why we devised this framework.
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